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BONUS BABIES  
ESCAPE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS:  
HOW MONEY AND POLITICS HAS 
TRANSFORMED THE CAREER PATHS OF 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS 
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CHRISTINA DWYER** 
KIRANJIT GILL*** 
Job prospects for former Supreme Court law clerks have radically 
changed in recent years.  Beginning in 1986, skyrocketing law firm 
signing bonuses caused a transformation from the natural sorting system, 
where clerks chose among private practice, government, academic, and 
public interest positions, to a Bonus Baby Regime where former clerks 
almost always choose to work in private firms after they leave the Court.  
This development is a result of both financial and ideological factors.  
While the more conservative clerking corps of recent years has been 
increasingly drawn to private practice, the firms themselves hire along 
ideological lines.  Still, while former clerks have largely eschewed non-
law-firm positions at the start, most clerks are not shackled by golden 
handcuffs and leave their first jobs after two years.  Thus, the new breed 
of bonus babies has unprecedented career options—both lucrative and 
prestigious—in a way that their predecessors never had. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The term “bonus baby”—once derisively used to describe young, 
unproven baseball players—has taken on a new meaning in recent 
years: it now describes the group of Supreme Court law clerks who 
choose to work for the elite law firms that are willing to pay them 
exorbitant bonuses and salaries.1  This relatively recent development—
which we argue began in 1986—has transformed the career paths of 
former High Court clerks who once chose equally between a slightly 
more lucrative private practice job and a slightly less lucrative 
government, academic, or public interest position to one where only a 
dwindling minority of clerks can resist passing up the considerable spoils 
of a law firm offer.  
There has been a growing body of research on Supreme Court law 
clerks in recent years, with much of it suggesting that during their 
tenures at the Court clerks exert an ideological or partisan influence on 
the institution.2  Yet there is relatively little research on what happens to 
 
1.  See David Lat, The Supreme Court’s Bonus Babies, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/opinion/18lat.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R8FL-
AT6L. 
2. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward 
eds., 2012); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS 
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006); Ryan C. Black & 
Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting 
Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147 (2012); Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Research Note, 
Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001); 
Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision 
Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (2008).  
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clerks after they leave the Court.3  A recent study examined post-
clerkship employment for 90% of Supreme Court clerks from the 
inception of the clerkship institution to the start of the Roberts Court 
(1882–2006).4  The authors traced how the Supreme Court clerkship 
changed from a relatively non-partisan institution to one where “the 
careers of former clerks show striking trends of political polarization in 
the recent history of the clerkship with regard to the legal academy, 
government service, and private practice.”5  Like these authors, we also 
explore the question of political polarization but do so in an intra-
regime context—one transformed by signing bonuses and 
unprecedented demand for Supreme Court clerks.6  We also update the 
analysis by, for the first time, examining the behavior of Roberts Court 
clerks.  Specifically, we compare data on the post-clerkship choices of 
the clerks of the Roberts Court (2005–2011) compared to their 
predecessors—the clerks of the Rehnquist Court (1986–2004).7  Thus, 
we exclude the relatively non-partisan years—at least in terms of post-
clerkship career paths—of prior Courts.  We explore the types of 
positions clerks took: private practice, government, academia, and 
public interest.  We examine whether the choices made by clerks reflect 
ideological or partisan preferences, as measured by the Justices the 
clerks worked for. 
Ultimately, we find that there has been a marked increase in recent 
years of clerks choosing to enter private practice.8  We suggest this is a 
result of both financial and ideological developments.  Specifically, the 
 
3.  See KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE 
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 161–70 (1993); William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott 
Messinger & Michael Jo, The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, 
and Reincarnation?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1780–95 (2009) [hereinafter The Liberal 
Tradition]; William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The 
Supreme Court Clerkship and the Polarization of the Court: Can the Polarization Be Fixed?, 
13 GREEN BAG 2D 59, 60–66 (2009). 
4.  The Liberal Tradition, supra note 3, at 1753. 
5.  Id. 
6. See Dahlia Lithwick, Bonus Round: What to Make of Those Astronomical Supreme 
Court Signing Bonuses?, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2007, 7:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/bonus_round.html, archived at http://perma.cc/48MP-
RAZ5.  
7.  There were 902 Supreme Court clerks, including clerks for retired Justices, who 
served at the Court from 1986–2011. We were able to find employment information for 817 
(91%) using internet sources such as martindale.com, Linkedin.com, and law school and law 
firm websites.  
8.  See infra Figure 2. 
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explosion of signing bonuses for Supreme Court clerks has made private 
practice even more financially attractive than it already was.9  Also, a 
more conservative clerking corps, the result of a more conservative 
Court, has been less interested in positions outside of private practice, 
with government and public interest work on the decline.10  Still, most 
clerks leave their first jobs, and those who initially choose private 
practice are as likely to decide to stay in that sector in another firm as 
they are to switch to government work or academia.11  And while the 
attraction of private practice may, at first glance, seem to suggest that 
recent clerks are behaving in a less ideological—and perhaps more 
rational—way, the law firms that hire clerks do so along ideological or 
partisan lines.12 
 
II. THE BONUS BABY REGIME: 
THE RISE OF PRIVATE PRACTICE AND THE DECLINE OF 
GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC, AND PUBLIC INTEREST JOBS 
From the beginning of the clerkship institution at the end of the 
nineteenth century through the present day, former Supreme Court law 
clerks have parlayed their apprenticeships with the Justices into 
positions in private practice, government, academia, and public interest 
organizations.13  Historically, clerks made these choices based on their 
individual interests—termed a “natural sorting process” by Carter 
Phillips, a 1978 clerk for Chief Justice Warren Burger who went on to 
become a managing partner at the law firm Sidley Austin.14  Yet in 1986, 
Phillips unwittingly changed the Natural Sorting Regime.  He sought to 
hire a few Supreme Court clerks whom he was particularly impressed 
with and offered them $5,000–$10,000 bonuses to sign a contract with 
his firm.15  As a result, the legal equivalent of the bonus baby was born.  
He recalled, “I think I’m the person who came up with this cockamamie 
idea in the first place . . . .  I’ll take the heat for creating this system.  But 
 
9.  See Lithwick, supra note 6. 
10.  See infra Figures 2, 3, 6 & 7. 
11.  See infra Figures 11, 12 & 13. 
12.  See infra Figures 14 & 15. 
13.  See Peppers & Zorn, supra note 2, at 55. 
14.  Lithwick, supra note 6; Joan Biskupic, Lawyers Emerge as Supreme Court 
Specialists, USA TODAY, May 16, 2003, at 6A. 
15.  Lithwick, supra note 6. 
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I was never the market leader for driving it up.”16  In an effort to 
compete, other firms began matching or exceeding existing bonuses, and 
the dollar amounts slowly rose through the 1990s as firms competed for 
clerks who sought private practice jobs.17  Though the amounts were 
rising, the bonuses were still not enough to entice at least some clerks 
from eschewing preferred academic, government, or public interest law 
work for private practice.  Tim Wu, an academic who clerked for Justice 
Stephen Breyer in 1999, said, “I’m sort of glad we didn’t have [an 
exorbitant] bonus in my day . . . .  Money like that leaves you no option.  
In my case, it would have ruined my career.”18  
Yet by the early 2000s, the demand for former clerks only escalated 
as law firms ramped up their recruiting of former clerks, specialized 
appellate and Supreme Court practices began developing, and signing 
bonuses began to explode.19  In May 2006, Thomas C. Goldstein said, 
“The [bonus] explosion . . . happened about four or five years ago 
because of the prestige factor that comes with a Supreme Court clerk, 
and the pool is not that big.”20  At the same time, Washington Post 
journalist Charles Lane reported:  
 
The law firms’ scramble for Supreme Court clerks 
became so intense a couple of years ago that firms began 
inviting the entire clerk class en masse to expensive 
dinner receptions.  The justices, concerned about 
appearances, put a stop to it, according to lawyers and 
former clerks. 
Now, each individual justice sets rules for when and 
how his or her clerks can get in touch with firms, though 
all agree that clerks may not talk to firms that have 
matters pending before the court.21 
 
 
16.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17.  See id. 
18.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19.  See Tom Goldstein, The Expansion of the “Supreme Court Bar,” SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 2, 2006, 11:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/03/the-expansion-of-the-supreme-
court-bar, archived at http://perma.cc/8B5M-D3X3; Lithwick, supra note 6. 
20.  Charles Lane, Former Clerks’ Signing Bonuses Rival Salaries on the High Court, 
WASH. POST, May 15, 2006, at A15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21.  Id.  
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Figure 1 shows the first post-clerkship jobs held by Supreme Court 
clerks during the Bonus Baby Regime.  Two-thirds (68%) went directly 
from the Court to positions in private practice.  On one level this is not a 
surprising finding given that the vast majority of law school graduates go 
into private practice22 and the large salaries and signing bonuses offered 
to former Supreme Court clerks make this option difficult to resist.  For 
example, in August 2013, clerks heading to New York, Washington 
D.C., and San Francisco received $300,000 signing bonuses from such 
firms as Gibson Dunn, Jones Day, Munger Tolles, Paul Weiss, Skadden 
Arps, and Sullivan & Cromwell.23  One year later, signing bonuses 
increased to $330,000 at Kellogg Huber and reportedly others.24  Given 
that the starting salaries for third-year associates—the rank at which 
former clerks generally enter the firm—are well into the six figures with 
additional year-end bonuses of six figures, former clerks can earn more 
than half a million dollars in their first post-clerkship year.25  Not a bad 
haul, considering that the Justice they clerked for is making less than 
half that to sit on the highest court in the land.26 
  
 
22.  AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, 2012 
LAW GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT DATA, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/da
m/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/law_grad_employ
ment_data.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DZ92-97J9. 
23.  David Lat, It’s Official: Supreme Court Clerkship Bonuses Hit A New High, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Aug. 15, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/its-official-supreme-
court-clerkship-bonuses-hit-a-new-high/, archived at http://perma.cc/E7BB-SLYQ. 
24.  David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch: Into 2016 We Go—Plus SCOTUS 
Clerk Bonus News, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 9, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/0
9/supreme-court-clerk-hiring-watch-into-2016-we-go-plus-scotus-clerk-bonus-news/ (last 
updated Sept. 10, 2014, 1:30 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/FX4P-7Q2X. 
25.  Law Firms’ Signing Bonuses: Supreme Desire, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2013, at 56 
[hereinafter Supreme Desire].  
26.  In 2013, the Chief Justice’s salary was $224,618, with his colleagues each making 
$214,969.  Id. 
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Figure 1 
U.S. Supreme Court Law Clerks:  
First Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011 
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In addition to the firms just mentioned, there are many more that 
routinely compete for Supreme Court clerks.27  Carter Phillips explained 
the competition: “Law firms are like lemmings—they all walk off the 
cliff together . . . .  One year a firm would be more aggressive, and then 
the other firms are willing to match the best offer out there.”28  Beth 
Heifetz, a partner at Jones Day and a 1985 law clerk for Justice Harry 
Blackmun, explained why clerks are in demand: “We have found it’s a 
terrific investment for us . . . .  They are incredibly smart, and they’re up 
on big issues in the law . . . .  They have this unique view of how judges 
think, of how the justices interact.”29  Neal Katyal, a partner at Hogan 
Lovells and 1996 clerk for Justice Stephen Breyer, said that clients ask 
for specific former clerks by name, which “is ultimately going to benefit 
the bottom line of the firm.”30  Though billable hours are important, the 
main reason clerks are sought after is because having former clerks on 
staff lends firms the prestige they need to attract high-paying clients.31 
Still, despite the feeding frenzy promulgated by these firms, one-
third of clerks during the Bonus Baby Regime have chosen to forego 
this payday for positions in government (17%), academia (12%), and 
“other” (3%) areas—largely public interest.32  Orin Kerr, a former clerk 
for Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2003, said, “I never really thought 
about going to a law firm . . . .  I’m an academic and looked forward to 
going back.”33  But it appears to be getting harder to resist becoming a 
bonus baby.  Figures 2 and 3 make plain that the trends are 
unmistakable: greater numbers of clerks are forgoing government, 
academic, and public interest jobs in favor of private practice and the 
bonuses that go along with it.  
  
 
27.  See infra Figure 14. 
28.  Brent Kendall, High-Court Clerks Attract a Frenzy: Law Firms Offer Signing 
Bonuses That Exceed Justices’ Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2012, at B1 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
29.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Beth Heifetz, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesd
ay.com/bheifetz/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/58E-PGSG. 
30.  Kendall, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted); Peter Lattman, Law 
Blog Lawyer of the Day: Neal Katyal, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (June 19, 2006, 10:43 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/06/29/law-blog-lawyer-of-the-day-neal-katyal/, archived at http://perm
a.cc/4JET-Y8H9. 
31.  See Kendall, supra note 28. 
32.  See supra Figure 1. 
33.  Lane, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Figure 2 
Bonus Baby Regime Trends:  
Private Practice v. Government Jobs, 1986–2011 
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Figure 3 
Bonus Baby Regime Trends:  
Academic and Public Interest Jobs, 1986–2011 
 
 
  
 2014] BONUS BABIES ESCAPE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS 237 
Figure 2 illustrates how private practice has become the rule over 
time, with 2003 the last year where roughly half the clerks chose 
something else at the conclusion of their clerkships.  As previously 
mentioned, that was also the time when bonuses exploded and clerks 
were courted by firms like never before.34  Since then, the percentages 
have risen steadily to the point where the final year under study, 2011, 
saw a whopping 95% of the clerks choose private practice—an 
unprecedented total.35  At the same time, the percentage of clerks 
choosing government positions following their clerkships has steadily 
declined.  As many as one-third of the clerks were still choosing 
government work as late as 1995, but in recent years the percentage has 
dropped to single digits with a record low of 3% choosing this route in 
2011.  Figure 3 shows similar declines for both academic and public 
interest law work.36  Specifically, the number of clerks choosing 
academia following their year at the Court was still one in five as late as 
2003.  Yet only 3% chose academia in 2011.  Public interest law has 
always been the least desirable post-clerkship employment choice, but 
the downward trend is also present here, with 11% of clerks making this 
choice in the mid-1980s compared to none by 2011.  These figures make 
plain that today there are more bonus babies among Supreme Court 
clerks than ever before. 
Another way to capture this trend is to compare clerks who served 
during the Rehnquist Court (1986–2004) to clerks who served during the 
Roberts Court (2005–2011).  Figure 4 also shows that there has been a 
decided shift, with more clerks choosing private practice in recent years: 
64% of Rehnquist Court clerks compared to 81% for Roberts Court 
clerks.  And while there was a slight decline from Rehnquist to Roberts 
in the percentage of clerks choosing academia (12% to 10%) and 
other/public interest work (3% to 1%), the real decrease came in clerks 
choosing government positions (20% to 8%).  There are two possible 
explanations for this development.  One is the explosion of signing 
bonuses.  In 2003, near the end of the Rehnquist Court, clerks were 
receiving signing bonuses of $85,000.37  The tripling of signing bonuses 
over the next decade may not only explain the explosion of clerks 
entering private practice but also may have fundamentally changed the 
 
34.  See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
35.  See supra Figure 2.  
36.  See supra Figure 3. 
37.  Kendall, supra note 28. 
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post-clerkship career path for the foreseeable future.38  With firms 
setting up specialized appellate—and even Supreme Court—practices, 
competition is fierce for former Supreme Court clerks who have 
specialized knowledge, have experience, and can immediately begin 
working on major cases, even if they are barred from working on 
Supreme Court cases for their first two post-clerkship years.39 
Figure 4 
Comparing the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Clerks:  
First Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011 
 
 
 
  
 
38.  See Lat, supra note 23; Lithwick, supra note 6; Supreme Desire, supra note 25. 
39.  Supreme Desire, supra note 25; see supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 5 
Comparing the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Clerks:  
Percentage of Clerks Working for Liberal and Conservative Justices,  
1986–201140 
 
 
 
  
 
40.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
BERKELEY L., http://mqscores.berkeley.edu (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MZA5-KKBJ. 
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Another reason for the growing number of clerks choosing private 
practice is that the Court has become more conservative under Chief 
Justice Roberts—particularly with the replacement of Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor with Justice Samuel Alito—and the Justices are hiring 
more conservative clerks who in turn may be more likely to seek 
employment in private practice.  Figure 5 shows that there are in fact 
more clerks working for conservative Justices during the Roberts Court 
(63%) than there were during the Rehnquist years (57%).  While that 
increase is not enough to explain the burst of private practice hiring in 
recent years, it may be part of the picture. 
Figure 6 
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology, 1986–201141 
  
 
41.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
supra note 40. 
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In fact, as Figure 6 illustrates, clerks who worked for conservative 
Justices were more likely to enter private practice (73%) than were 
clerks who worked for liberal Justices (61%).  Interestingly, the 
percentage going into government work is nearly identical (18% and 
17%), while clerks for liberal Justices are more likely to choose 
academia (15% v. 10%) and other/public interest (6% v. 0.5%) than 
were clerks for conservative Justices.  These results suggest that there is 
an ideological element to post-clerkship career paths.  Figures 7 and 8 
break down these overall results by Court.  As with the overall trend, 
Figure 7 shows that during the Rehnquist years, clerks for conservative 
Justices were more likely to go into private practice (68%) than were 
clerks for liberal Justices (58%).  Clerks for liberal Justices during the 
Rehnquist years were more likely to work in academia (15% v. 11%) 
and other/public interest law (7% v. 1%), while government work was 
essentially evenly divided (20% v. 21%).42  Figure 8 illustrates how the 
Roberts Court reflects the overall trend that clerks for conservative 
Justices are more apt to go into private practice (88%) than are clerks 
for liberal justices (70%).  Yet the percentages for both are much higher 
than they were under Chief Justice Rehnquist, indicating that a bonus 
baby shift has occurred.  
Interestingly, the shift to greater private practice employment that is 
present for clerks from both liberal and conservative Justices is not 
consistent across other categories.43  The one constant is that clerks for 
liberal Justices chose academic work at a consistent rate (15%) across 
both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.  But under Chief Justice 
Roberts, clerks for liberal Justices were much less likely to choose 
government (20% v. 12%) or other/public interest (7% v. 3%) work 
than they were under Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Conversely, clerks for 
conservative Justices greatly increased their rate of academic 
employment under Chief Justice Roberts (24% v. 11%) and greatly 
decreased their rate of government work (5% v. 21%) as compared to 
clerks for conservative Justices during the Rehnquist years.  These 
results suggest that in addition to ideology, the massive monetary 
difference between private practice and government work is having an 
effect across the board.  Indeed, unlike government employees, 
academics are able to supplement their income through consulting, 
 
42.  See infra Figure 7. 
43.  See infra Figures 7 & 8. 
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speaking, and writing,44 which may help explain why recent clerks for 
conservative Justices are twice as likely to enter academia as they were 
in the past. 
 
Figure 7 
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology: 
Rehnquist Court, 1986–200445 
 
 
 
  
 
44.  See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807 (2009). 
45.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
supra note 40. 
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Figure 8 
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology:  
Roberts Court, 2005–201146 
 
 
  
 
46.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
supra note 40. 
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Figures 9 and 10 provide further illustration of how private practice 
has become an increasingly common choice among clerks for both 
conservative and liberal Justices.  Figure 9 shows how three out of four 
clerks for the most conservative Justices of the Rehnquist Court (Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) chose 
private practice.  But the Court’s two newest conservatives—Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—have even higher rates of clerks 
entering private practice.  In fact, with only a single exception, every 
clerk for Chief Justice Roberts has gone into private practice.47  Former 
Roberts clerk Hagan Scotten explained why he and other clerks 
accepted offers from law firms: “Most of us had $100,000 in law-school 
debt . . . .  Getting rid of that debt is a good way to start.”48  
But, the increase in private practice employment is by no means 
limited to clerks for conservative Justices.  Figure 10 shows a similar 
pattern for clerks who worked for liberal Justices who are also 
increasingly choosing private practice.  Indeed, three out of four clerks 
for the last three liberal appointees—Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan—have accepted offers from law firms.  This is a significant 
change from the clerks for the most liberal Justices of the Rehnquist 
Court—Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun—who only chose 
private practice half of the time.  An example is Elizabeth Prelogar, who 
clerked for Justice Ginsburg in 2009 and Justice Kagan in 2010 and 
subsequently began working at the law firm Hogan Lovells.49 
  
 
47.  See infra Figure 9. 
48.  Kendall, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49.  Id. 
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Figure 9 
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology:  
Conservatives, 1986–201150 
 
 
(n=424)  
  
 
50.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
supra note 40. 
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Figure 10 
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology: Liberals, 1986–201151 
 
 
(n=303)   
 
51.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
supra note 40. 
 2014] BONUS BABIES ESCAPE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS 247 
Figures 9 and 10 also show that while there has been an increase in 
private practice employment for clerks for both liberal and conservative 
Justices, there are a number of differences across the other categories 
that suggest that certain Justices are steering many of their clerks away 
from or toward government, academic, or public interest careers.52  
Justice Byron White placed 57% of his clerks in government positions 
during his years on the Rehnquist Court.53  No other Justice even comes 
close to these totals, with liberal Rehnquist Court Justices Marshall 
(27%), Souter (25%), and Blackmun (23%) placing the next highest 
percentage of their clerks in government posts.54  At the other end of the 
spectrum, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have placed only 4% 
of their clerks in government jobs, with Justices Breyer (9%) and 
Brennan (11%) placing the next fewest.  In terms of academic jobs, 
Justice Marshall had the highest total (27%), followed by Justices 
O’Connor (22%) and Ginsburg (17%).  Several Justices—Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices White and Kagan—placed no clerks in academic 
positions during the period under study, with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
(2%) and Justices Scalia (8%) and Thomas (8%) having very few clerks 
joining the academy.  Finally, Justices Brennan (22%) and Blackmun 
(19%) had by far the highest percentage of clerks go into public interest 
law work while many Justices had none, including, perhaps surprisingly, 
liberal Justices Marshall, Sotomayor, and Kagan and conservative Chief 
Justices Rehnquist and Roberts and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito.  
Thus, while these findings suggest that there is an ideological or 
partisan element to post-clerkship career paths, that tendency has been 
somewhat tempered in recent years by the pull of large signing bonuses 
for clerks choosing private practice.  Yet, as we will demonstrate later in 
this Article, law firm hiring also reflects ideological or partisan 
differences.55  But what happens to clerks after they secure their first 
job?  Do they move, and if so, where?  What prompts moves from one 
job to another?  Is there an ideological element to moving to and from 
private practice and government work?  We turn to these questions in 
the next section. 
 
52.  See supra Figures 9 & 10. 
53.  See supra Figure 9. 
54.  See supra Figure 10.  
55.  See infra Figure 15. 
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III. ESCAPING THE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS: JOB HOPPING AND THE 
IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF LAW FIRM HIRING 
There is a school of thought that some clerks choose to avoid private 
practice because they may have a difficult time leaving once they get 
used to the large salaries and bonuses and the lifestyle that goes with 
them.  For example, James Stern, who clerked for Justice Anthony 
Kennedy in 2010, said,“[it] is a great deal of money to walk away 
from . . . .  I had some concern about the golden handcuffs—getting 
locked in and finding it hard to walk away from the money once I 
started down that path.”56  Stern chose academia instead, taking a job at 
the University of Virginia.57  Do golden handcuffs keep clerks in private 
practice?  And how likely are clerks in general to leave their first post-
clerkship job for another?  Figure 11 shows that it is the norm, with two 
out of three (65%) clerks leaving their first position for another.  Clerks 
for liberal Justices are slightly more likely than clerks for conservative 
Justices to move (70% v. 62%).  Interestingly, nearly half of all clerks 
(45%) leave their first job for a position in a different sector, such as 
moving from private practice to academia or from government work to 
private practice.  Again, clerks for liberal Justices are more likely than 
clerks for conservative Justices to move to a different sector (53% v. 
39%).  Yet this also means that there are some clerks (20%) who change 
jobs but stay in the same sector, such as moving from a large firm to a 
boutique firm or from one academic or government post to another. 
  
 
56.  Kendall, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57.  Id. 
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Figure 11 
Percentage of Clerks Moving from First to Second  
Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011 
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Figure 12 
Common Paths from First to Second Post-Clerkship Job:  
Different Sector, 1986–2011 
 
(n=326) 
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Figure 13 
Common Paths from First to Second Post-Clerkship  
Job by Justice Ideology, 1986–201158 
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But when clerks change sectors, where do they move and are there 
differences between clerks for liberal and conservative Justices?  Figure 
12 shows the common paths from first to second post-clerkship jobs.  
Overall, one out of three clerks who leave their first job (34%) move 
from private practice to government work.  Similarly, nearly one out of 
three clerks (29%) leave private practice for an academic post.  Thus, 
clerks are most likely to choose private practice for their first job and 
will most likely leave that job for another either in a different firm, in 
the government, or academia.  Thus, while there may be a golden 
handcuffs effect for some clerks, it is by no means the norm.  Figure 13 
shows that there are some ideological or partisan differences when it 
comes to career paths.  While clerks for both liberal and conservative 
Justices move from private practice to academia at a similar rate (30% 
v. 29%), clerks for conservative Justices are far more likely to move 
from private practice to government jobs than are clerks for liberal 
Justices (40% v. 28%).  For example, former Roberts clerk Scotten said 
that he hoped to return to government service after gaining private 
sector experience.59  Conversely, clerks for liberal Justices are more 
likely than clerks for conservative Justices to move from government to 
academic jobs (10% v. 5%), public interest to academic (6% v. 1%), and 
academic to private practice (4% v. 2%).60  These findings suggest that 
ideology operates on job choice, with academia and public interest work 
generally the province of liberals.   
As previously mentioned, the Bonus Baby Regime has given rise to 
an elite group of law firms that compete for Supreme Court law clerks.61  
Figure 14 lists the firms that have hired the most clerks directly from the 
Supreme Court in recent years.  Sidley Austin and WilmerHale are the 
industry leaders, with each hiring 50 clerks—roughly 70% directly from 
the Court—since the start of the Bonus Baby Regime in 1986.  The next 
group—Jones Day, Kirkland & Ellis, and Gibson Dunn—have hired 
roughly 30 clerks during the same time period, nearly all of whom came 
directly from the Court.  The following group has hired roughly 20 
clerks: Mayer Brown; O’Melveny & Myers; Jenner & Block; Kellogg 
Huber Hansen; Latham & Watkins; Munger, Tolles & Olson; and 
Williams & Connolly.  The numbers continue to decline, with many 
firms hiring only one or two clerks.  In all, over the course of their 
 
59.  Kendall, supra note 28. 
60.  See supra Figure 13. 
61.  See supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text. 
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careers, 563 clerks were hired by 90 different firms during the period 
under study.  Thus, the top five firms for employing former Supreme 
Court clerks account for one-third (34%) of all hires.  And the top 
twelve firms account for well over half (58%) of all clerk hires.  
Figure 14 
Number of Clerks Hired by Law Firms:  
First v. All Post-Clerkship Jobs, 1986–2011 
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Figure 15 
Number of Clerks Hired by Law Firms by Justice Ideology, 1986–201162 
 
  
 
62.  Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores.  Martin-Quinn Scores, 
supra note 40. 
 2014] BONUS BABIES ESCAPE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS 255 
 Does the growth in private practice employment mean that clerks 
are less ideological in choosing careers than they once were?  Figure 15 
illustrates law firm employment by Justice ideology.  The results are 
striking.  There is indeed a considerable ideological or partisan 
difference in the law firms that clerks work for.  WilmerHale 
overwhelmingly hires clerks who worked for liberal Justices (39) as 
opposed to clerks who worked for conservative Justices (11).  Similarly, 
Jenner & Block skews liberal (16 v. 3) as do Munger, Tolles & Olson (12 
v. 6) and O’Melveny & Myers (12 v. 8).  Some firms essentially only hire 
clerks who work for liberal Justices: Ropes & Gray (7 v. 1), Morrison & 
Foerster (7 v. 0), and Debevoise & Plimpton (6 v. 0).  Countering the 
liberal juggernaut of WilmerHale are conservative bastions Sidley 
Austin (13 clerks from liberal Justices v. 37 clerks from conservative 
Justices), Kirkland & Ellis (3 v. 30), Jones Day (6 v. 27), and Gibson 
Dunn (2 v. 25).  A number of other firms skew conservative: Latham & 
Watkins (5 v. 13), Kellogg Huber Hansen (7 v. 12), Mayer Brown (9 v. 
12), Covington & Burling (5 v. 9), and Sullivan & Cromwell (3 v. 8).  
Finally, there are firms that essentially only hire clerks from 
conservative Justices, with one or two exceptions: Bartlit Beck (2 v. 11), 
Hogan Lovells (1 v. 8), King & Spalding (2 v. 8), Baker Botts (2 v. 7), 
and Bancroft (0 v. 7).  There are only a few firms that have come close 
to parity in hiring clerks from both liberal and conservative Justices: 
Williams & Connolly (10 clerks from liberal Justices v. 8 clerks from 
conservative Justices), Wachtell Lipton (4 v. 5), Davis Polk (4 v. 4), and 
Skadden Arps (3 v. 4).  Thus, the data make plain that ideology plays a 
key role in the decision of law firms to hire Supreme Court law clerks.  
IV. THE TWO-YEAR RULE:  
LENGTH OF TIME IN POST-CLERKSHIP JOBS 
Having paid off their loans, after a short time, some clerks leave 
firms for academia or government work.63  Firms are acutely aware of 
this possibility and attempt to distinguish between clerks who will be 
short-timers and those who are likely to remain with the firm for a 
longer period of time, if not indefinitely.64  There is an informal norm 
that clerks work for their initial firm for at least two years before 
making a switch.65  And while some firms pay the bonuses in 
 
63.  Supreme Desire, supra note 25. 
64.  Kendall, supra note 28.  
65.  Lane, supra note 20. 
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installments or write contracts to require clerks to return part of their 
bonuses should they leave early,66 it does not appear that they are 
enforced—particularly if the clerk leaves for a government post as 
opposed to switching to another firm, as clerks do return to firms after 
government service.  For example, 2010 Ginsburg clerk Keith Bradley 
left WilmerHale less than one year after he was hired for a government 
job in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.67  Similarly, 2010 
Thomas clerk Elbert Lin left Wiley Rein—a firm he had worked at as 
an associate before his clerkship—short of the informal two-year mark 
to become West Virginia’s solicitor general.68 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the length of time that 
clerks stay in their first and second jobs.  While there are instances of 
clerks departing after only a single year or less, the modal length of time 
for first jobs for both Rehnquist and Roberts Court clerks is two years.  
Thus, it appears that the two-year rule is in fact the norm.  Interestingly, 
the modal length of time for second jobs for Rehnquist Court clerks was 
also two years but only one year for Roberts Court clerks.  This suggests 
that Roberts Court clerks may be staying in their first jobs as long as 
their predecessors did but may be willing to move more quickly from 
their second positions.  Figure 16 helps illuminate these findings by 
comparing the length of time that Rehnquist and Roberts Court clerks 
spent in their first jobs after leaving the Court.  It is plain that the vast 
majority of clerks leave their first jobs within a few years—consistent 
with the descriptive statistics in Table 1.  Yet, only 8% (16) of Roberts 
Court clerks departed their first jobs after one year or less compared to 
12% (51) of Rehnquist Court clerks.  Though the data reflect only the 
first eight years of the Roberts Court, they suggest that Roberts Court 
clerks may be less likely to leave their first jobs early but more likely to 
leave their second jobs more quickly than did past clerks.  This may very 
well be due to the strengthening of the informal—and now more 
formal—two-year norm as increasing numbers of clerks choose private 
practice for their first jobs.69  As second jobs are just as likely to be in 
 
66.  Will Baude, The Missing Part of the Washingtonian Signing Bonus Story, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 3, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/03/the-missing-part-
of-the-washingtonian-signing-bonus-story/, archived at http://perma.cc/7EZ8-YBHL. 
67.  Marisa M. Kashino, Hiring Supreme Court Clerks: The $500,000 Gamble, 
WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 2013, at 15. 
68.  Id. 
69.  See supra Figure 2. 
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academia or the government as they are to be in another firm,70 former 
clerks on the whole are less constrained by the two-year norm at that 
stage. 
 
 
Table 1 
Length of Time in First and Second Post-Clerkship Jobs:  
Descriptive Statistics, 1986–2011 
 
Rehnquist  
Court:  
1st Job 
Roberts  
Court:  
1st Job 
1st  
Job  
Total 
Rehnquist 
Court:  
2d Job 
Roberts  
Court:  
2d Job 
2d  
Job  
Total 
Mean 7.27 3.57 6.12 6.12 3.29 6.26 
Median 4 3 4 5 3 5 
Mode 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 28 8 28 24 7 24 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.76 1.85 5.96 5.49 1.84 5.31 
N= 434 199 633 386 51 437 
 
  
 
70.  See supra Figure 12. 
 258 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:227 
 
Figure 16 
Comparing the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Clerks:  
Length of Time in First Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The career paths of former Supreme Court law clerks have been 
radically transformed in recent years.  In 1986, the Natural Sorting 
Regime—where clerks chose among private and public positions with 
relatively similar salaries—gave way to the Bonus Baby Regime 
characterized by escalating signing bonuses, ramped up recruiting by 
select firms, and the rise of specialized appellate and Supreme Court 
practices.  Clerks have flocked to private practice in unprecedented 
numbers due to both lucrative signing bonuses and a more conservative 
clerking corps.  Taking a position with one of the elite firms that recruit 
clerks has become the rule, and working in academia, government, or 
public interest the rare exception.  But the vast majority of clerks leave 
their first jobs within the first few years after they leave the Court.  
Those who initially choose private practice leave in equal numbers for 
another private practice position, a government job, or academia.  
At the same time, the job choices of clerks also reflect ideological 
considerations.  Clerks who work for conservative Justices are more 
likely to enter private practice than are clerks for liberal Justices.  
Similarly, clerks for liberal Justices are more likely to enter government 
or public interest jobs.  The firms that heavily recruit former clerks do so 
on partisan lines, with some firms dominated by clerks who worked for 
conservative Justices and others populated by clerks for liberal Justices.  
Thus, the new generation of Supreme Court law clerks is composed of 
liberal and conservative bonus babies eager to don the golden handcuffs 
of private practice for a couple years before thinking about their next 
short-term posts either in another firm, government, or the academy.  
When compared to the humble beginning of the clerkship institution—
or even the institution as it existed for most of the past century—the 
power and status of Supreme Court law clerks has never been higher. 
